In 2000, the number of Internet users around world was estimated to be 361 million. Over the space of a decade, this number then increased to just over 2 billion users. Indeed, some of the most dramatic increases in Internet use have occurred across the developing world. The number of users in Africa, for instance, rose from 4.5 million in 2000 to 139.9 million in 2011 – a 2,988% increase.

The above explosion in numbers has also meant an exponential increase in vulnerabilities. The critical infrastructures of states and transnational corporations, for example, have become increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks from other states or private actors.

As a result, we have witnessed in recent history an upsurge of white papers and strategy documents that explicitly link cyber-security to national security. In fact, a handful of countries has gone one step further and developed specific cyber-security strategies. These strategies rightfully assume that next-step cyber-technologies not only promise greater synergies, and therefore efficiencies, in a cyber-dependent world, but also increased opportunities for industrial sabotage, cybercrime and espionage, and even warfare. (The attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities by the Stuxnet computer virus might be illustrative of two or three of these ‘twilight’ activities and, depending on your perspective, perhaps all four.)

In response to the above trends, and in order to understand how and why cyberspace has become increasingly securitized, we begin this week’s investigation by looking at The Militarisation of Cyber Security as a Source of Global Tension, written by the Center for Security Studies’ Myriam Dunn Cavelty. She emphasizes that the militarization of cyberspace is likely to increase cyber-insecurity rather than safeguard key state infrastructures. This analysis sets the stage for a follow-on debate on whether Stuxnet-like programs are likely to become an integral part of future conflict or not. On Tuesday, we make the case that cyber-warfare is already an essential feature of many leading states’ strategic calculations. This is argument is then followed by its opposite – i.e., one that believes the threat posed by cyber-warfare capabilities is woefully overstated.

Because many states believe that cyber-security could be better safeguarded by relying on public-private partnerships, on Thursday we consider some of the factors that make such partnerships difficult to achieve, particularly in the case of protecting critical infrastructure. Finally, we conclude our week with a case study – i.e., we consider how Switzerland is trying to address the dual problem of maintaining 'cyber' information assurance and infrastructure protection at the same time.