Related Articles for "Commerce, Sanctions and Security"
November 2012
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14 Nov 2012
Iran's Untouchable Energy Exports
International sanctions have limited Iran's foreign currency earnings from oil and natural gas exports. However, OilPrice.com's John Daly reveals that Tehran has been able to bypass these impediments and export electricity to several important allies of the US. More on «Iran's Untouchable Energy Exports»
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9 Nov 2012
Weapons Proliferation and Sanctions – Future Opportunities
Sanctions imposed against Iran and North Korea have failed to curb both states' nuclear programs. W Pal Singh Sidhu argues that the key to more effective sanction regimes may lie with talks that cover a broader range of issues, alongside sanctions that have been endorsed by the entire international system. More on «Weapons Proliferation and Sanctions – Future Opportunities»
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8 Nov 2012
Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 2)
Both Tehran and the Iranian population are under considerable pressure as a result of unprecedented economic sanctions. However, because the present regime has staked its legitimacy on the nuclear program, sanctions are unlikely to succeed as long as it remains in power and relinquishment of all right to enrich uranium is required, argues Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi. More on «Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 2)»
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8 Nov 2012
Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 3)
Both Tehran and the Iranian population are under considerable pressure as a result of unprecedented economic sanctions. However, because the present regime has staked its legitimacy on the nuclear program, sanctions are unlikely to succeed as long as it remains in power and relinquishment of all right to enrich uranium is required, argues Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi. More on «Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 3)»
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8 Nov 2012
Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 4)
Both Tehran and the Iranian population are under considerable pressure as a result of unprecedented economic sanctions. However, because the present regime has staked its legitimacy on the nuclear program, sanctions are unlikely to succeed as long as it remains in power and relinquishment of all right to enrich uranium is required, argues Eskandar Sadeghi-Boroujerdi. More on «Sanctioning Iran: Implications and Consequences (part 4)»
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6 Nov 2012
Pressuring Milosevic: Financial Pressure Against Serbia and Montenegro, 1992 – 1995 (Part 1)
Cases where economic sanctions have obviously worked are rare. However, UNSC sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro between 1992 and 1995 may be such a case. According to Victor Comras, they led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the end of the Bosnian War. More on «Pressuring Milosevic: Financial Pressure Against Serbia and Montenegro, 1992 – 1995 (Part 1)»
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6 Nov 2012
(Part 2)
Cases where economic sanctions have obviously worked are rare. However, UNSC sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro between 1992 and 1995 may be such a case. According to Victor Comras, they led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the end of the Bosnian War. More on «(Part 2)»
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6 Nov 2012
(Part 3)
Cases where economic sanctions have obviously worked are rare. However, UNSC sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro between 1992 and 1995 may be such a case. According to Victor Comras, they led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the end of the Bosnian War. More on «(Part 3)»
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6 Nov 2012
(Part 4)
Cases where economic sanctions have obviously worked are rare. However, UNSC sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro between 1992 and 1995 may be such a case. According to Victor Comras, they led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the end of the Bosnian War. More on «(Part 4)»
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6 Nov 2012
(Part 5)
Cases where economic sanctions have obviously worked are rare. However, UNSC sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro between 1992 and 1995 may be such a case. According to Victor Comras, they led to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and the end of the Bosnian War. More on «(Part 5)»
