In a region largely bereft of regional organizations and long divided by the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been the most significant multilateral group for the past forty-five years. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has grown increasingly influential. While much of the West and most emerging markets continue to suffer because of the 2008 global recession, the leading ASEAN economies have recovered and are thriving.1 Perhaps most important, ASEAN has helped prevent interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia, despite several brewing territorial disputes in the region.

Yet ASEAN lags far behind its full potential. Most Western leaders and even many of Southeast Asia’s own top officials do not consider the organization capable of handling any serious economic or security challenges, including the current dispute in the South China Sea. In previous times of severe economic downturn, ASEAN members have looked to lenders outside the group for assistance. Because it lacks unity and high-profile leadership, ASEAN’s members have resorted to addressing disputes either bilaterally or with U.S. involvement.

The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta runs with a skeleton staff one-tenth of the size of the European Commission’s and also smaller than the African Union’s. Unlike the African Union, ASEAN possesses no peacekeeping force; unlike the Organization of American States (OAS), it has no strong mechanism for enforcing human rights; unlike the Arab League, ASEAN’s top leaders attract little attention from the international media; and unlike the European Union (EU), ASEAN has continually failed to adhere to commitments for deeper economic integration and broader free trade.

Given its size (a population of over 630 million), enormous collective economic weight, and powerful members like Indonesia and Singapore, ASEAN has the potential to become more influential. If it had more open borders and free intra-ASEAN trade, it could attract more investment, improve its competitiveness in a range of industries, and play a larger role in international economic and trade forums. An empowered ASEAN Secretariat could also handle diplomatic, economic, and security challenges in a much more aggressive and comprehensive manner than it does now. In short, an organization with power and internal coherence and skilled at solving economic and political challenges could form the foundation for broader East Asian integration and gain greater respect on the world stage.

A stronger, unified ASEAN would also benefit the United States. A single, liberalized ASEAN market would boost U.S. investment in Southeast Asia, and an assertive ASEAN would be able to take over some U.S. responsibilities in the areas of peacekeeping, antipiracy, disease prevention, and other security issues. Moreover, it would represent a powerful deterrent against Chinese dominance of the South China Sea and the broader Asia-Pacific.